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OpenBMC Remote OS Deployment: A Simplified Approach
OpenBMC Remote OS Deployment: A Simplified Approach Many BMC implementations can accept a disk image and present it as a read-only USB mass storage device inserted into the host machine, allowing the host machine to boot from this “disk” for remote installation of the operating system or maintenance tasks.
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Protect the Watcher: Hardened SIEM/XDR server with VED
Background Modern cybersecurity operation centers significantly depend on two key elements: agent-based security solutions operating on desktops, laptops, and server operating systems, and a threat analysis system, often referred to as a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system or eXtended Detection and Response (XDR).
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Vault Range - The Measure and Resilience of Weaponized Exploit Methods for Linux
Disclaimer VED (Vault Exploit Defense) test image contains only the VED kernel module, and does not contain any security baselines, access control policies and situational hardening solution.
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+PROTECTING LINUX AT KERNEL LEVEL WHY AND HOW
Introduction We designed Vault Exploits Defense (VED) as a foundation security layer for various flavors of Linux operating system.
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Memory corruption in JCRE: An unpatchable HSM may swallow your private key
Background The key has always been a core target of security protection.
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Avoiding Single-Point-of-Failure and securing the Root Infrastructure: TCG TPM 2.0
What is TCG TPM 2.0? Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.
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Demystifiying SMPC (Secure multi-party computation) and its threat model
Prologue SMPC is an interesting topic, whose the applications include systematic security and cryptographic engineering, and this article will discuss its principles, threat models and use-case.
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The exploit recon 'msg_msg' and its mitigation in VED
Why msg_msg? The size of structure is control by userspace Firstly, the length of the msg_msg struct can be indirectly controlled from userspace, which means that msg can overlap the cache of the specified types.
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The below-OS for supply chain of critical infrastructure protection
Background The endless cyber “war” in the levels of OS
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What can we learn from leaked Insyde's BIOS for Intel Alder Lake
Leaked story timeline According to the timestamp of the github repository, an unidentified user uploaded the Insyde’s partial firmware solution (4.
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