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    <title>HardenedVault - Building Your Own Cyber Bunker</title>
    <link>https://hardenedvault.net/</link>
    <description>Recent content on HardenedVault - Building Your Own Cyber Bunker</description>
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    <language>en-US</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 13:37:21 +0200</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://hardenedvault.net/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Beyond Cat-and-Mouse: From 2021 (a13xp0p0v) to 2026 (Singularity) — Exploitation Stage Is the Only Real Frontier</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2026-03-17-beyond-cat-and-mouse-a13xp0p0v-singularity-rootkits/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2026-03-17-beyond-cat-and-mouse-a13xp0p0v-singularity-rootkits/</guid>
      <description>Beyond Cat-and-Mouse: From 2021 (a13xp0p0v) to 2026 (Singularity) — Exploitation Stage Is the Only Real Frontier Singularity is currently one of the most highly engineered rootkits.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>VED 2026: after CFI - data only</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2025-09-17-dfi-security/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Sep 2025 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2025-09-17-dfi-security/</guid>
      <description>after CFI - data only The exploitation techniques and mitigation has been evolving rapidly since the paper &amp;ldquo;Smash the Stack for Fun and Profit&amp;rdquo; released in Phrack Issue 49.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>HOWTO: build ATF (Trusted Firmware ARM) and OPTEE for RK3588</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2025-03-10-build-atf-optee-rk3588/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Mar 2025 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2025-03-10-build-atf-optee-rk3588/</guid>
      <description>HOWTO: build ATF (Trusted Firmware ARM) and OPTEE for RK3588 To better implement the protection of digital assets in embedded systems, we have chosen the RK3588 as the prototype platform.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>OpenBMC Remote OS Deployment: A Simplified Approach</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-11-17-openbmc-remote-deployment/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 Nov 2024 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-11-17-openbmc-remote-deployment/</guid>
      <description>OpenBMC Remote OS Deployment: A Simplified Approach Many BMC implementations can accept a disk image and present it as a read-only USB mass storage device inserted into the host machine, allowing the host machine to boot from this &amp;ldquo;disk&amp;rdquo; for remote installation of the operating system or maintenance tasks.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>SimpleX low-level protocol analysis</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-11-01-simplex-protoco-analysis-/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 01 Nov 2024 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-11-01-simplex-protoco-analysis-/</guid>
      <description>Background The SimpleX Chat Protocol is utilized by SimpleX Chat clients for message exchange.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>A Survey of deterministic approach RFC6979 for open source implementations: Mbed-TLS, GnuTLS and OpenSSL</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-10-12-survey-oss-tls-rfc6979/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 12 Oct 2024 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-10-12-survey-oss-tls-rfc6979/</guid>
      <description>Background The original implementation of DSA-type signature algorithms (including ECDSA) requires a random number that belongs to the same type of mathematical object as the private key (an element of GF(p), where p is a prime number).</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Project Cascais</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/products/cascais/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Sep 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/products/cascais/</guid>
      <description></description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>SLUBStick risk assessment for embedded systems</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-08-25-slubstick-risk-assessment-embedded-system/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 25 Aug 2024 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-08-25-slubstick-risk-assessment-embedded-system/</guid>
      <description>SLUBStick risk assessment for embedded systems The Linux kernel is susceptible to memory safety vulnerabilities due to its size and complexity.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>NBD: A Powerful Tool for data center</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-07-24-nbd/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 24 Jul 2024 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-07-24-nbd/</guid>
      <description>NBD: A Powerful Tool for data center NBD, the abbreviation for Network Block Device (protocol), is a protocol that was initially implemented in the Linux kernel version 2.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Demystifying SFTP</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-07-17-demystifying-sftp/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jul 2024 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-07-17-demystifying-sftp/</guid>
      <description>Introduction SFTP is an auxiliary protocol of SSH that allows file transfer between two hosts over the SSH protocol.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>HardenedVault released a hardened version of Ubuntu 24.04 LTS to enhancing various fields such as smart factory and crypto custody</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/news/2024-04-29-hardened_ubuntu_2404/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2024 01:13:37 +0800</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/news/2024-04-29-hardened_ubuntu_2404/</guid>
      <description>Hardened Linux Canonical released Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, bringing comprehensive upgrades to the free and open-source software components recently.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>xz/liblzma Backdoor: Open Source Nuke? Maybe Not That Bad!</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-03-31-xz-lzma-backdoor-open-source-nuke/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 31 Mar 2024 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-03-31-xz-lzma-backdoor-open-source-nuke/</guid>
      <description>xz/liblzma Backdoor: Open Source Nuke? Maybe Not That Bad! Story Background On March 29, 2024, a report exposing a backdoor in the upstream source code of the controversial open-source project, the xz software package, was made public on the oss-security mailing list.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Supermicro x11ssh-F OpenBMC Porting (WIP)</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-03-15-openbmc-x11ssh-port/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2024-03-15-openbmc-x11ssh-port/</guid>
      <description>Supermicro x11ssh-F OpenBMC Porting (WIP) Introduction to BMC and OpenBMC BMC, short for Baseboard Management Controller, is a specialized microcontroller embedded in certain computers, typically servers.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Key management of OpenPGP Card</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-10-11-key-management-openpgp/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Oct 2023 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-10-11-key-management-openpgp/</guid>
      <description>Key management of OpenPGP Card Background As blank smartcards supporting Java Card 3.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Protect the Watcher: Hardened SIEM/XDR server with VED</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-08-25-hardened-siem-xdr-ved/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Aug 2023 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-08-25-hardened-siem-xdr-ved/</guid>
      <description>Background Modern cybersecurity operation centers significantly depend on two key elements: agent-based security solutions operating on desktops, laptops, and server operating systems, and a threat analysis system, often referred to as a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system or eXtended Detection and Response (XDR).</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Announcing VED-eBPF: A Proof-of-Concept Implementation of Kernel Exploit and Rootkit Detection using eBPF</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/news/2023-08-11-ved-ebpf-poc/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/news/2023-08-11-ved-ebpf-poc/</guid>
      <description>We are thrilled to introduce VED-eBPF, an innovative proof-of-concept implementation that showcases the power of eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter) technology in enabling robust kernel security monitoring and exploit detection for Linux systems.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Secure Your Assets with HardenedVault’s security-enhanced Linux Built on AWS</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/news/2023-08-02-hardenedlinux-aws-marketplace/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Aug 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/news/2023-08-02-hardenedlinux-aws-marketplace/</guid>
      <description>Hardened Linux AWS has established multiple regions and availability zones worldwide, strictly adhering to security regulations and standards in each region, providing global deployment solutions to enterprises.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Vault Range - The Measure and Resilience of Weaponized Exploit Methods for Linux</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-07-16-vault-range-resilience-weaponized-exp-linux/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 16 Jul 2023 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-07-16-vault-range-resilience-weaponized-exp-linux/</guid>
      <description>Disclaimer VED (Vault Exploit Defense) test image contains only the VED kernel module, and does not contain any security baselines, access control policies and situational hardening solution.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>&#43;PROTECTING LINUX AT KERNEL LEVEL WHY AND HOW</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-07-09-protecting-linux-kernel-why-how/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 09 Jul 2023 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-07-09-protecting-linux-kernel-why-how/</guid>
      <description>Introduction We designed Vault Exploits Defense (VED) as a foundation security layer for various flavors of Linux operating system.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Memory corruption in JCRE: An unpatchable HSM may swallow your private key</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-04-18-java-card-runtime-memory-corruption/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Apr 2023 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-04-18-java-card-runtime-memory-corruption/</guid>
      <description>Background The key has always been a core target of security protection.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Avoiding Single-Point-of-Failure and securing the Root Infrastructure: TCG TPM 2.0</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-03-07-tpm2-ref-firmware-security/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 07 Mar 2023 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-03-07-tpm2-ref-firmware-security/</guid>
      <description>What is TCG TPM 2.0? Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.</description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>Demystifiying SMPC (Secure multi-party computation) and its threat model</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-02-02-smpc/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 02 Feb 2023 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2023-02-02-smpc/</guid>
      <description>Prologue SMPC is an interesting topic, whose the applications include systematic security and cryptographic engineering, and this article will discuss its principles, threat models and use-case.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The exploit recon &#39;msg_msg&#39; and its mitigation in VED</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-11-13-msg_msg-recon-mitigation-ved/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 13 Nov 2022 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-11-13-msg_msg-recon-mitigation-ved/</guid>
      <description>Why msg_msg? The size of structure is control by userspace Firstly, the length of the msg_msg struct can be indirectly controlled from userspace, which means that msg can overlap the cache of the specified types.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The below-OS for supply chain of critical infrastructure protection</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-11-03-critical-infrastructure-supply-chain-security/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 03 Nov 2022 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-11-03-critical-infrastructure-supply-chain-security/</guid>
      <description>Background The endless cyber &amp;ldquo;war&amp;rdquo; in the levels of OS</description>
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    <item>
      <title>What can we learn from leaked Insyde&#39;s BIOS for Intel Alder Lake</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-10-08-alderlake_fw-leak/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 08 Oct 2022 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-10-08-alderlake_fw-leak/</guid>
      <description>Leaked story timeline According to the timestamp of the github repository, an unidentified user uploaded the Insyde&amp;rsquo;s partial firmware solution (4.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>The magic about how modern OS boot</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-09-13-modern-os-boot-magic/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-09-13-modern-os-boot-magic/</guid>
      <description>Linux kernel Under x86/amd64 architecture, Linux kernel is usually packed into bzImage format, which contains a partially-filled data structure for boot parameter, and multiple entry points of stages for 16-bit real mode, 32-bit protected mode, and 64-bit long mode if built for amd64, the last stage is a self-decompressing flat binary, which will decompress and execute the gzip-compressed kernel image proper, also in the format of flat binary, stored in its data segment.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Technical analysis of syzkaller based fuzzers: It&#39;s not about VaultFuzzer!</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-08-07-state-based-fuzzer-update/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 07 Aug 2022 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-08-07-state-based-fuzzer-update/</guid>
      <description>0. VaultFuzzer S0rry, VaultFuzzer is not the main player today. We&amp;rsquo;re going have little ride with Harbian-QA and GREBE today.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Next Generation Data Center Security: The Cornerstone of Web3?</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-08-05-next-gen-data-center-web3/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 05 Aug 2022 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-08-05-next-gen-data-center-web3/</guid>
      <description>0. Next generation data center What is the next generation data center?</description>
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    <item>
      <title>VaultBoot: Attestation as a Service</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-06-27-vaultboot-attestation/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 27 Jun 2022 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-06-27-vaultboot-attestation/</guid>
      <description>VaultBoot In the highest level of security profile (CRITICAL), the Vault 111 hardware node enables multi-trust anchors through the chip security features.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>VED (Vault Exploit Defense): Open source implementation</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-06-16-ved-community-version/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 16 Jun 2022 01:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-06-16-ved-community-version/</guid>
      <description>VED - Linux kernel threat detection and prevention system LKM version of VED goes public finally.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>VaultBoot</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/products/vaultboot/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/products/vaultboot/</guid>
      <description></description>
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    <item>
      <title>VED (Vault Exploit Defense) &amp; SIEM/XDR integration</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/products/ved/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 11 Jun 2022 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/products/ved/</guid>
      <description></description>
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    <item>
      <title>Tetragon: case study of security product&#39;s self-protection</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-05-25-vspp/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 25 May 2022 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-05-25-vspp/</guid>
      <description>Story background CTO of cloud-native security company Isovalent announced that their eBPF-based Security Observability and Runtime Enforcement solution Tetragon ( WayBackMachine 20220516 ) become open source after years of development in May 16 2022.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Exploiting CVE-2021-26708 (Linux kernel) with sshd</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-03-01-poc-cve-2021-26708/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 01 Mar 2022 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-03-01-poc-cve-2021-26708/</guid>
      <description>Kernel vulnerability CVE-2021-26708 Alexander Popov has published an article Four Bytes of Power: Exploiting CVE-2021-26708 in the Linux kernel which use a four-byte overwrite vulnerability to do privilege escalation.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Intel SGX deprecation review</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-01-15-sgx-deprecated/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 15 Jan 2022 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2022-01-15-sgx-deprecated/</guid>
      <description>The rumors about Intel SGX deprecated in new processors has been confirmed, 12th generation processors (Workstation/Desktop/Laptop/embedded platforms) will deprecate SGX and the SGX will continue to support only in high-end Xeon CPU for server:</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Risk analysis of Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) and mitigation</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-12-17-analysis-cve-2021-44228/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 17 Dec 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-12-17-analysis-cve-2021-44228/</guid>
      <description>Risk analysis of Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) and mitigation Log4Shell is a high impact exploitable bug in Java logging framework logj4.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>VaultBoot: Next-Gen Firmware Security Solution</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-09-19-vaultboot/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 19 Sep 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-09-19-vaultboot/</guid>
      <description>Background Firmware is a special type of software, mainly used for the control and communication of the underlying hardware.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>VaultFuzzer: A state-based approach for Linux kernel</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-09-13-vaultfuzzer/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 13 Sep 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-09-13-vaultfuzzer/</guid>
      <description>Background Since the beginning of computer software development, software quality has become an inevitable issue in the field of software testing.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>VED (Vault Exploit Defense): A threat detection and prevention system</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-09-06-ved/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Sep 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-09-06-ved/</guid>
      <description>Background In the beginning of the hacker&#39;s era, a long-term battle for control of the &amp;ldquo;CORE&amp;rdquo; in memory has been waged since Aleph One published the paper Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit on Phrack Issue 49 in 1996.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>What every CISO and security engineer should know about Intel CSME</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-07-16-ciso-seceng_csme/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jul 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-07-16-ciso-seceng_csme/</guid>
      <description>Background The majority of infosec community are trying to ignore the risks below the OS in past decades but it&amp;rsquo;s impossible to bury all of them at low cost today.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>VaultHSM report: The way to confirm whether the Smart Card (J3H145) supports RFC-6979 ECDSA implementation</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-07-07-vaulthsm_ecdsa-rfc6979/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 07 Jul 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-07-07-vaulthsm_ecdsa-rfc6979/</guid>
      <description>Background The original implementation of DSA-type signature algorithm (including ECDSA) needs a random number which belongs to the same mathematical object of the private key (an element of GF(p), in which p is a prime number).</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Public crypto audit report: lurch/OMEMO</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-06-17-vault_lurch-audit/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Jun 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-06-17-vault_lurch-audit/</guid>
      <description>lurch/OMEMO Security Assessment Crypto is a neutral technology just like the natural existence (“For he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the just and on the unjust.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Vault1317 protocol: a modern approach for metadata protection with deniability</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-06-02-vault1317-thesis/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Jun 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-06-02-vault1317-thesis/</guid>
      <description>vault1317/signal-dakez: An authenticated key exchange protocol with a public key concealing and a participation deniability designed for secure messaging Richard B.</description>
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    <item>
      <title>Hello Vault* world!</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-05-27-hello_vaultworld/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 May 2021 13:37:21 +0200</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/blog/2021-05-27-hello_vaultworld/</guid>
      <description></description>
    </item>
    
    <item>
      <title>About Us</title>
      <link>https://hardenedvault.net/about/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
      <guid>https://hardenedvault.net/about/</guid>
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      <description>Why you should contact us! The strength of the security defender&amp;rsquo;s spirit would then be measured by how much &amp;rsquo;truth&amp;rsquo; he/she could tolerate.</description>
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